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 In response to this Court’s order of May 23, 2011, appellees respectfully 
submit that the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) is not applicable to these proceedings.   
 1. The AIA provides, with statutory exceptions not implicated here, that 
“no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall 
be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person 
against whom such tax was assessed.”  26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).  The purpose of the 
AIA is to preserve the government’s ability to assess and collect taxes with “a 
minimum of preenforcement judicial interference, and to require that the legal right 
to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund.”  Bob Jones Univ. v. 
Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted).   The AIA, 
when applicable, bars any suit seeking relief that “would necessarily preclude” the 
assessment or collection of taxes under the Internal Revenue Code, regardless of 
the plaintiff’s professed motivation for the suit.  Id. at 731-32. 
  a. Like other provisions that “govern[] a court’s adjudicatory capacity,” 
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011), the AIA 
limits the federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Hansen v. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 528 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 2007); Gardner v. United States, 211 
F.3d 1305, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  Accordingly, if the AIA applied here, it would 
deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear a pre-implementation challenge to the 
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minimum coverage provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 26 U.S.C.A. § 
5000A. 
b. In the district courts, the government argued for dismissal of these actions 
under the AIA.  On further reflection, and on consideration of the decisions 
rendered thus far in the ACA litigation, the United States has concluded that the 
AIA does not foreclose the exercise of jurisdiction in these cases.  Unique 
attributes of the text and structure of the ACA indicate that Congress did not intend 
to dictate a single pathway to judicial review of Section 5000A – i.e., failure to 
maintain minimum essential coverage starting more than two and a half years from 
now, in January 2014; payment of the tax penalty starting nearly four years from 
now, in April 2015; and, only then, commencement of an action seeking a tax 
refund.    
As noted, the AIA applies to a “suit for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax.”  26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).  Separate provisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code expressly provide that certain penalties will be deemed 
“tax[es]” for purposes of other parts of the Code, including the AIA.  Thus, the 
second sentence of Section 6671(a) provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided, 
any reference in this title to ‘tax’ imposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer 
to the penalties and liabilities provided by this subchapter.”  26 U.S.C. § 6671(a)  
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(emphasis added).  Thus, the AIA bars a suit to restrain assessment or collection of 
a “penalty” established in Subchapter B of chapter 68 (in which 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6671(a) appears) because such penalties are deemed taxes for purposes of all of 
Title 26.  Likewise, paragraph (2) of Section 6665(a) provides that “any reference 
in this title to ‘tax’ imposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to . . . 
penalties provided by this chapter [68].”  26 U.S.C. § 6665(a)(2).  
The minimum coverage provision penalty, however, appears in Chapter 48 
of Subtitle D (“Miscellaneous Excise Taxes”), not Chapter 68.  See 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5000A.  It is therefore not among the “penalties” that come within the ambit of 
the AIA by reason of Sections 6665(a)(2) or 6671(a). 
To be sure, Congress provided in the ACA that “[t]he penalty provided by 
this section . . . shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as an assessable 
penalty under subchapter B of chapter 68.”  26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(g)(1).  And the 
first sentence of 26 U.S.C. § 6671(a) (in subchapter B) provides that “[t]he 
penalties and liabilities provided by this subchapter [B] . . . shall be assessed and 
collected in the same manner as taxes.”  (The Internal Revenue Code elsewhere 
specifies the manner in which taxes are assessed, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6255, and 
collected, id. §§ 6301-6344.)  But Congress differentiated in Section 6671(a) itself 
between assessment and collection of assessable penalties (the first sentence) and 
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other Internal Revenue Code-specific attributes applicable to assessable penalties 
(the second sentence).  And Section 5000A(g)(1) mirrors only the former, and 
indeed does so without referring to Section 6671(a).  The significance of that 
choice is illuminated by comparing the limited instruction in Section 5000A(g)(1) 
to other actual cross-references in the Code. 
For example, several tax penalty provisions, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 5114(c)(3), 
5684(b) & 5761(e), expressly cross-reference to Section 6665(a), which provides 
that “the additions to the tax, additional amounts, and penalties provided by this 
chapter shall be paid upon notice and demand and shall be assessed, collected, and 
paid in the same manner as taxes,” 26 U.S.C. § 6665(a)(1), and, as noted, that “any 
reference in this title to ‘tax’ imposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to   
. . . penalties provided by this chapter [68],” id. § 6665(a)(2).  It is Section 
6665(a)(2) that renders the AIA applicable to those penalties.  In contrast to 
Section 5000A(g)(1), these cross-reference provisions also mention “taxes” and 
cite to (all of) Section 6665(a) – i.e., they identically provide that the penalty “shall 
be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as taxes, as provided in section 
6665(a).”  26 U.S.C. §§ 5114(c)(3), 5684(b), 5761(e). 
Section 5000A(g)(1), by contrast, does not specifically cross-reference 
Section 6671 (or Section 6665(a)).  Nor does Section 5000A(g)(1) state that the 
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penalty shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as “taxes.”  Instead, it 
provides that the penalty will be assessed and collected in the same manner as an 
“assessable penalty.”  Finally, Section 5000A(g)(1) does not provide that the 
penalty shall be “paid” in the same manner as an assessable penalty or (as noted 
above) refer to Section 6671(a), which provides that penalties and liabilities 
provided by subchapter B of Chapter 68 “shall be paid upon notice and demand” 
by the Secretary.  Rather, Section 5000A(g)(1) includes its own directive that the 
penalty “shall be paid upon notice and demand by the Secretary.”  
Given that Congress in other penalty provisions had included explicit cross-
references to Section 6665(a), the distinctions discussed above indicate that the 
absence of such a specific cross-reference to that section or to Section 6671(a), and 
thus derivatively to the AIA, was deliberate.1  
The structure and legislative history of the ACA support this conclusion.  
First, in Section 5000(A)(g)(2)(B) (the provision immediately following the 
                                                          
1 This conclusion is further reinforced by the contrast between Section 
5000A(g)(1) and Section 9010 of the ACA, which establishes a penalty and 
provides that it “shall be subject to the provisions of subtitle F of the Internal 
Revenue Code . . . that apply to assessable penalties imposed under chapter 68 of 
such Code.”  See ACA § 9010(g)(3)(C), as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1406, 26 U.S.C.A. Subt. D, note.  In 
contrast to the limited direction in Section 5000A(g)(1), the broad cross-reference 
in Section 9010 incorporates all of Sections 6665(a) and 6671(a), both of which 
appear in Subtitle F.  
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“assessed and collected” provision discussed above), Congress prohibited the IRS 
from filing a notice of lien or levying on property in order to collect the penalty.2  
Those actions are among the principal tools the federal government uses to collect 
unpaid taxes, and, as a practical matter, resort to those tools is what a pre-
enforcement challenge to a tax statute would typically “restrain” (26 U.S.C. 
§ 7421(a)).  Because those particular tools are unavailable in the context of the 
minimum coverage provision, it makes sense that Congress would regard it as 
unnecessary to apply the AIA to bar challenges to the minimum coverage 
provision prior to its effective date.   
Second, and as the government has acknowledged, the minimum coverage 
requirement is “integral” to the ACA’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating 
provisions – i.e., Sections 2701, 2702, 2704 (with respect to adults), and 2705(a) of 
the Public Health Service Act, as added by Section 1201 of the ACA – which go 
into effect in 2014 along with that requirement and cannot be severed from it.  See 
U.S. Response/Reply Brief at 47, Virginia v. Sebelius; see also U.S. 
Response/Reply Brief at 58, Florida v. HHS, Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th 
Cir.) (filed May 18, 2011).   Congress would not have wanted to wait until after 
                                                          
2 The ACA also provides that “[i]n the case of any failure by a taxpayer to timely 
pay any penalty imposed by this section, such taxpayer shall not be subject to any 
criminal prosecution or penalty with respect to such failure.”  26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5000A(g)(2)(A).  
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these interconnected provisions were implemented (and relied upon by millions of 
individuals, as well as the insurance industry) for challenges to the constitutionality 
of the minimum coverage provision to be resolved. 
Third, Congress delayed the effective date of the minimum coverage 
provision, thus dramatically mitigating the risk of disruption to ongoing 
administration of the tax code that the AIA is intended to prevent.  The AIA’s 
purpose is to prevent anyone from interfering with the federal government’s 
administration of the Tax Code, from forcing it by judicial fiat to treat a particular 
taxpayer or group of taxpayers differently than others, and from compelling it to 
stop or alter the ongoing business of tax enforcement.  This broad challenge to the 
constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision, which was brought nearly 
four years before the minimum coverage provision is to be implemented, five years 
before any tax is to be paid and the IRS begins assessing and collecting those 
taxes, and well before the IRS has even set up the systems to administer the 
provision, poses no realistic threat of such disruption --  in contrast to the threat of 
disruption to the administration of the ACA that postponing review would raise. 
Finally, the ACA’s legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress 
did not intend the AIA to prohibit pre-enforcement challenges to the minimum 
coverage provision.  In enacting the statute, Members of Congress reflected an 
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awareness that constitutional challenges were “likely” to be adjudicated, but never 
suggested that the only way for an individual to obtain review would be to refuse 
in 2014 to maintain the minimum essential coverage the ACA sought to ensure, 
pay the tax penalty in 2015, and commence a refund action.  155 Cong. Rec. 
S13,823 (Dec. 23, 2009) (Sen. Hatch); see also 156 Cong. Rec. E475-02 (Mar. 21, 
2010) (Rep. Bonner) (noting “there are already attempts to challenge [the 
provision] in court”). 
2.  As the United States has explained (U.S. Opening Brief at 58-61, 
Virginia v. Sebelius; U.S. Opening Brief at 54-59, Liberty v. Geithner), the 
minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional power 
over taxation.  But that conclusion does not mean that the AIA bars this lawsuit; 
the two inquiries are distinct. 
In “passing on the constitutionality of a tax law,” a court is “concerned only 
with its practical operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive 
words which may be applied to it.”  Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 
363 (1941) (citation omitted).  The minimum coverage provision easily satisfies 
that test.  Among other things, it will be administered by the IRS; any penalty is 
due on April 15 with individuals’ tax returns; and, in many cases, the penalty will 
be a percentage of income.  In “practical operation,” id., this is a tax for 
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constitutional purposes.  That inquiry, unlike the technical question of whether 
Congress intended the AIA to apply, does not depend on the particular Chapter in 
which the provision appears in the Internal Revenue Code or the precise language 
of the statutory cross-references Congress employed.  
The distinction between these inquiries is illustrated by two Supreme Court 
cases from 1922.  In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 
U.S. 20 (1922), the Court upheld a claim for a tax refund, and invalidated a federal 
child labor tax law as a punitive sanction.  Nevertheless, on the same day, the 
Court ordered dismissal of a pre-enforcement suit to enjoin collection of the same 
tax.  Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922).  The Court held that “[t]he averment 
that a taxing statute is unconstitutional does not take this case out of” the 
predecessor to the AIA.  Id. at 20.  The Court has since reiterated that the AIA 
applies even where the taxpayer challenges Congress’s power to enact a purported 
tax.  See Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 740-41; Alexander v. Americans United, 
Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 759-60 (1974).  
 The converse is also true.  For the reasons provided above, this Court may 
determine that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the AIA does not apply here 
and that Section 5000A is an exercise of Congress’s taxing power. 
Appeal: 10-2347     Document: 96      Date Filed: 05/31/2011      Page: 12 of 16
10 
 
 3. An individual plaintiff may also challenge Section 5000A in a refund 
suit.  A taxpayer who seeks a refund of taxes that he claims were unlawfully 
assessed or collected may sue either in a district court or the Court of Federal 
Claims.  28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1).  However, he must first comply with the tax 
refund scheme in the Internal Revenue Code – i.e., pay the challenged tax and file 
an administrative claim for a refund with the IRS before bringing suit.  26 U.S.C. 
§ 7422(a).  Having complied with these prerequisites, the taxpayer may challenge 
the constitutionality of the tax in his refund suit, see, e.g., United States v. 
Clintwood Elkhorn Min. Co., 553 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2008), but could not do so in this 
context until 2015 at the earliest, after he failed to maintain minimum coverage 
during the 2014 tax year.  In the unique circumstances of this case, we do not 
believe that Congress intended a refund suit to be the sole recourse for a 
constitutional challenge to the minimum coverage provision.   
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      Respectfully submitted, 
 
      NEAL KUMAR KATYAL 
       Acting Solicitor General  
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      BETH S. BRINKMANN  
       Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
        
      TIMOTHY J. HEAPHY 
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